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Russia’s Foray into Asia’s 
Energy Market
Morena Skalamera
‘Sanctions are counterproductive and senseless, especially against such 
country as Russia.’1 President Putin used these words immediately after 
the Trump–Putin Helsinki summit in August 2018. By then Russia 
had already launched its pioneering Yamal liquefied natural gas (LNG) 
project, representing Putin’s defiant stance against Western sanctions. 
Yamal signalled that Russian LNG activities aimed at the Asian market 
had not been constrained by Western sanctions since 2014.
Russia’s move into the Asian energy market was no easy feat and many 
of Russia’s initial forays had failed. By mid-2014, the effect of geopolitical 
pressure on Russia was magnified by a collapse in global oil prices. This 
dual condition inflicted hardship on the Russian economy, with some 
fearing Moscow could be headed for a recession. While sanctions were 
consequential, the Russian economy struggled more from the swift decline 
in global oil prices. The devastating effect of the collapse in oil prices, and 
the low oil prices since, have overall dwarfed the shock of the sanctions 
for the Russian economy.
1  Clark Mindock, ‘Putin Says New US Sanctions on Russia are “Senseless”’, Independent, 22 August 
2018, www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/us-russia-sancions-latest-putin-trump-
washington-moscow-a8503371.html.
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America’s Challenge
The fall in the price of oil was largely a consequence of oversupply—a result 
of new technology and capital investments in the US; weakening demand, 
particularly from China;2 and the increasingly self-sufficient US energy 
market.3 By injecting new oil and gas supplies into a well-fed market, 
America’s ‘unconventional’ boom was shaking up the energy world and 
posing an existential threat to traditional oil and gas producers. The 
challenge in oil affected the so-called OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) grouping, too, and was not confined to Russia. But 
the challenge in gas was more targeted; it had the potential of weakening 
Russia’s dominance over its holy of holies—the European gas market.
European gas markets had never been as lucrative as the budget-sustaining 
revenue that Russia made with the black stuff, but gas trade with Europe 
has always been about much more than profits. Since Soviet times, these 
pipelines—whose life cycle spans over 25 years or more—enabled Russia to 
project political influence and, occasionally, helped Moscow to drive wedges 
between ‘old’ and ‘new’ EU member states. This ability to play pipeline 
politics in Europe and transit countries in-between had great repercussions 
in the policy world as it helped Putin’s efforts to demand geopolitical 
deference and transmit the impression that Russia stood tall in world affairs.
Between 1999 and 2008, oil rents were a bonanza for Putin’s exuberant 
economic growth. The Russian Government used the budget surplus 
to close the state debt, increase social spending and finance an ever-
expanding military apparatus. Today, just as then, energy revenue is critical 
for the country’s federal budget, with oil revenue accounting for about 
40 per  cent of the Russian budget, and gas revenue for far less, about 
10 per cent, while still playing a large role in Russia’s efforts at restoring 
its ‘rightful’ place on the world stage.4
2  China had seen GDP growth drop from 10.3 per cent in 2010 to 6.9 per cent in 2015.
3  Several analysts anticipated the subsequent decline by evaluating investment patterns in oilfields 
over the past decade. See, Leonardo Maugeri, ‘Oil: The Next Revolution’, Discussion Paper, 2012, 
Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School.
4  ‘The Ministry of Finance Disclosed the Size of Future Windfall Oil Profits’, Vedomosti, 9 July 
2018, www.vedomosti.ru/economics/news/2018/07/09/774948-minfin-raskril-razmer-buduschih-
sverhdohodov-ot-nefti. The total oil and gas revenues of the federal treasury in 2018 will amount 
to ₽7.23 trillion (42.4 per cent of total income); in 2019, ₽8.32 trillion (41.9 per cent); in 2020, 
₽7.9  trillion (39.5 per cent); in 2021, ₽7.77 trillion (37.8 per cent). See, Ministerstvo finansov 
Rossijskoj Federacii, ‘Osnovnye Napravlenija Bjudzhetnoj, Nalogovoj I Tamozhenno-Tarifnoj 
Politiki na 2019 God I na Planovyj Period 2020 i 2021 Godov’, [Main directions of the budgetary, 
tax, customs and tariff policies for 2019, and for the planned period of 2020 and 2021], 2018, 
accessed 1 September 2020, www.komitet-bn.km.duma.gov.ru/upload/site7/ONBNiTTP(2).pdf.
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Given this strong dependence on energy revenue, when the US shale 
boom hit global markets, some authors argued that this transformative 
change posed a major geopolitical quandary for conventional oil and gas 
producers, primarily OPEC and Russia.5 Some energy analysts, along with 
the International Energy Agency, were quick to emphasise that Russia was 
likely to emerge as the industry’s top loser.6 Opposite this, some argued 
that, for all the challenge, Russia would maintain its dominant role in 
supplying gas to Europe. They also contended that, to the extent that 
Russia was forced to modify its modus operandi in Europe, it was more 
due to the EU’s regulatory efforts than to any impending competition 
by US LNG.7
While nearly everyone agreed that the unconventional revolution was 
a negative development for Russia, analysts debated the extent to which 
this was likely to be consequential. For many it seemed likely to make 
Russia less economically robust, more vulnerable to external actor 
influence and with fewer tools to shape the international arena.8 Given 
the large role that energy revenue played in determining Russia’s political 
trajectory, some predicted greater impetus for political reform, others 
more foreign policy adventurism to compensate for imminent domestic 
instability and yet others speculated about the need to find new markets 
for hydrocarbon export-oriented growth. One thing, however, was clear: 
the emergence of US shale upended global energy markets and created 
a dual challenge for Russia. In oil, it suppressed long-term prices with 
5  For example, see Andrei V. Belyi and Andreas Goldthau, ‘Between a Rock and a Hard Place: 
International Market Dynamics, Domestic Politics and Gazprom’s Strategy’, EUI Working Paper 
RSCAS 2015/22; James Henderson and Arild Moe, ‘Gazprom’s LNG Offensive: A Demonstration of 
Monopoly Strength or Impetus for Russian Gas Sector Reform?’, Post-Communist Economies 28, no. 3 
(2016): 281–99, doi.org/10.1080/14631377.2016.1203206.
6  Andrew Critchlow, ‘Russia Will Be Biggest Loser from Oil Price Fall, Warns IEA’, Telegraph, 
10 February 2015. See also Clifford Krauss, ‘Boom in American Liquefied Natural Gas Is Shaking 
Up the Energy World’, New York Times, 16 October 2017, www.nytimes.com/2017/10/16/business/
energy-environment/liquified-natural-gas-world-markets.html.
7  Tim Boersma, Tatiana Mitrova, Geert Greving and Anna Galkina, Business As Usual. European 
Gas Market Functioning in Times of Turmoil and Increasing Import Dependence (Washington, DC: 
Brookings, Policy Brief, 2014); Tatiana Mitrova and Tim Boersma, ‘The Impact of US LNG on 
Russian Natural Gas Export Policy’, Columbia’s Center on Global Energy Policy, December 2018, 
energypolicy.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/pictures/Gazprom%20vs%20US%20LNG_CGEP_
Report_121418_2.pdf; Morena Skalamera and Andreas Goldthau, ‘Russia: Playing Hardball or 
Bidding Farewell to Europe?’, Discussion Paper, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, 
Harvard Kennedy School, June 2016, www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/
Russia%20Hardball%20-%20Web%20Final.pdf.
8  Meghan O’Sullivan, Windfall: How the New Energy Abundance Upends Global Politics and 
Strengthens America’s Power (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2017).
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potentially devastating consequences for the country’s budget. In natural 
gas, it created a new rival in the increasingly globalising markets for LNG, 
both in Europe and in Asia. Russia needed to react to maintain key social 
provisions, or worse, contain potential instability at home.
Europe’s Long Game
In Europe, as the market for LNG was becoming, well, more liquid,9 
this development was married with the EU’s regulatory efforts to deliver 
a competitive and transparent gas market, and to force longstanding external 
suppliers, like Gazprom, to compete. In 2015, a newly self-contained 
American gas market had weakened Russia’s hold on the European market 
(even before the US had yet exported a single molecule of gas), by creating 
a gas bubble in a well-supplied market. The effects of the US natural gas 
boom were propelled by a parallel rapid expansion of other LNG, such 
as plentiful Qatari alternatives, which were now hitting the lower-priced 
European LNG hubs, forcing competition with its dominant pipeline 
gas supplier, Gazprom. With the spectre of true competition looming 
over Gazprom, an emboldened EU pushed for effective liberalisation of 
the gas market through the so-called ‘Third Energy Package’, and made 
supply systems more resilient via new interconnectors between countries 
dependent on Russian gas imports.
Gazprom did eventually adapt—with some notable concessions such 
as a partial erosion of oil-indexed pricing and more flexible pricing—
as it sought to preserve market share in its most prized market.10 And 
Gazprom certainly is able to compete; the company’s main advantage is 
price. Its upstream production costs are one of the industry’s lowest at 
around US$20 per 1,000 cubic metres.11 Rouble devaluation supports 
the attractiveness of Russian gas (as the majority of the cost is indexed in 
roubles) and piped gas is generally a cheaper transportation method than 
9  Given that new LNG deliveries were increasingly freed from the so-called destination clauses—
an old regime of rigid contracts with fixed destinations.
10  By shifting parts of its contract to ‘spot’ pricing, which itself is formed through the daily 
interactions of thousands of buyers and dozens of sellers.
11  ‘UPDATE 1–Gazprom Sees No Need for Europe Price War, No US LNG Threat’, Reuters, 
31 May 2016, www.reuters.com/article/russia-gazprom/update-1-gazprom-sees-no-need-for-europe-
price-war-no-u-s-lng-threat-idUSL8N18S230.
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LNG. Hence, while demand for Russian gas in Europe has risen in recent 
years, prices—and thus Gazprom’s revenue per cubic metre—have fallen 
amid pressure from competitors.
In 2018, Gazprom doubled net profit to a record high as it exported more 
gas than ever to Europe and Turkey for a third year in a row, pushing its 
market share to 37 per cent.12 In 2020, Russia had planned to start gas 
flows via two geopolitically critical export pipelines. The first, TurkStream, 
connecting Russian gas to Turkey and onto South-East Europe, came 
online in early 2020. However, the second pipeline, a second line of 
Nord Stream (Nord Stream II) linking Russian gas to Germany and 
Northern Europe, remains incomplete. Again, Gazprom’s advantages are 
low production and transportation costs. Russia’s gas deliveries to Europe 
have  been consistently competitive in the last couple of years (and by 
US$1–1.5 per mmbtu cheaper than those of its LNG competitors) and 
so, the gas behemoth is likely to continue servicing about one-third of EU 
needs in the next decade or so.13
Longer term, however, Europe presents very few growth opportunities. 
A key factor here is Europe’s gas demand. Given sluggish economic 
growth, most analysts bet on flat demand in the near term, but imports 
will grow due to falling domestic production in countries such as the 
United Kingdom or the Netherlands.14 In such a situation, Russian gas 
remains the most competitive source.15 However, crucial parts of Western 
Europe are now committed to an ambitious zero-carbon emissions target 
by 2050. This new age of renewables means that there is limited room 
for natural gas in Europe’s future energy mix, with obvious challenges 
for traditional gas players in the region and especially for Europe’s gas 
12  ‘Russia’s State-Owned Gazprom Doubles Profit on Higher Gas Sales’, Financial Times, 29 April 
2019. 
13  For a detailed analysis see Tatiana Mitrova, ‘Russian Natural Gas Supplies to Europe Competition 
with the US LNG’, Presentation, Hague Centre for Strategic Studies, 8 September 2016, 7. See also 
James Henderson, ‘Russian Gas in Europe: How Competitive and How Secure’, Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, June 2016, slideplayer.com/slide/10879936/. 
14  For a more detailed discussion, see for instance, IEA, Gas 2019 (Paris: IEA, 2019), www.iea.org/
reports/gas-2019; BP, BP Energy Outlook 2035, January 2014, www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-
sites/en/global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/energy-outlook/bp-energy-outlook-2014.pdf.
15  European gas demand is expected to reach 564 bcm in 2020 and 618 bcm in 2030, according 
to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. From the production cost perspective, Russian gas is the 
EU’s cheapest option. This, in turn, means that despite the EU’s strong move towards renewables, 
Russian gas deliveries to the continent will likely stay stable at about one-third of EU’s gas imports. 
See, Anouk Honoré, The Outlook of Natural Gas Demand in Europe (Oxford: Oxford Institute for 
Energy Studies, NG 87, 2014), doi.org/10.26889/9781784670030.
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overlord—Gazprom. For all of the EU Competition Commission’s mettle 
in taking on Gazprom, and America’s relentless efforts ‘to wean Europe 
of Moscow’s energy grip over the continent’, ironically, it may well be 
Europe’s ambitious ‘greening’ agenda that presents the strongest challenge 
to Russia maintaining strength in its preferred gas market.16
Anticipating a steady decline in Europe’s demand, Russia has long 
advocated the need to turn to Asia, the world’s epicentre of economic 
growth. Yet, easy money in Europe had, over the years, made Gazprom 
fat and slow to change course. The EU had been a lucrative market and 
more attractive culturally speaking. China represented a bet on uncharted 
territory, and Beijing refused to pay the high European prices for piped 
gas. As long as Russia could sell to Europe all the gas required to keep the 
Russian economy growing, it did not have to budge over price or share its 
energy wealth with Chinese investors.17 Ongoing plans included two gas 
pipelines from Siberia to China that were discussed over the 2000s but 
never finalised as the two sides bickered over prices.
In 2014, all this had changed. Western sanctions mixed with the tangible 
results of the US unconventional revolution (by 2014, the US already had 
three operational LNG production trains18 and the first US LNG cargo 
set sail two years later, in 201619) upended this picture in fundamental 
ways. Given the extent of the challenge, it was decided at the time that 
Gazprom would keep its monopoly of piped gas to Europe and concentrate 
on maintaining European market share; that Rosneft would become the 
national champion in oil; and that Novatek, a more agile company, would 
take on the task of directing a swift commercial and diplomatic focus to 
the growing Asian LNG markets. China was a crucial part of this plan 
to lessen the impact of Western sanctions by finding alternative markets 
and sources of capital, but the strategy, allegedly, was to ‘pivot’ Russia’s 
economy towards Asia, and not just to China.
16  ‘Energy Diversity and Security Remarks By Secretary Rick Perry’, US Department of Energy, 
14 November 2018, www.energy.gov/articles/energy-diversity-and-security-remarks-secretary-rick-perry.
17  China was hoping to gain equity stakes in Russia’s unrivalled gas fields as a quid pro quo in 
return for the pipeline deal. Due to resource nationalism and low trust, Russia was not excited to 
share the domestic pie. This had, at times, involved retrospective legislation concerning major projects 
and, in turn, threatened the country’s reputation as a reliable investment partner.
18  With a total capacity of 13.5 mt/y (18.6 bcm/y). For more information, see International Gas 
Union, IGU 2018 World LNG Report, www.igu.org/resources/2018-world-lng-report-27th-world-
gas-conference-edition/.
19  Daniel J. Graeber, ‘First US LNG Cargo Sets Sail’, UPI, 26 February 2016, www.upi.com/
Energy-News/2016/02/25/First-US-LNG-cargo-sets-sail/9231456403122/.
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Russia’s Reaction to America’s 
Shale Boom
Some believed that the effects of America’s reshaping of the world 
markets for natural gas would force the Russian Government to spur 
reform in its gas sector. The government did not rise to the occasion; 
instead, these developments were accompanied by protectionism, the 
bolstering of massive state-owned energy enterprises and an ever-assertive 
Russian posture on the international stage. The failure to reform, in 
turn, meant that new markets for Russia’s prime export commodities—
oil and gas—would become crucial to economic and political stability. 
The government’s line continued to be that Gazprom’s hold on its export 
monopoly raised the competitiveness of Russian gas in export markets. 
Domestically, through price controls, the government kept control 
over the regions, provided a safety net for the poor and kept potentially 
explosive areas (such as Chechnya and Dagestan) in check. Rather than 
competing with each other in the face of economic challenges, Russian 
companies were encouraged to find a way to split the market pie at home. 
One expert, close to the Russian Government, said at the time, ‘there 
is a hybrid situation—an oligopoly with regional monopolies—Rosneft, 
Gazprom, and Novatek divide the market among themselves and try not 
to interfere in each other’s business’.20
Such division of labour also applied to export markets; the recognition 
of Gazprom’s role as the sole exporter of piped gas meant that, in return, 
everyone concerned would accept Novatek’s role as the prime exporter 
of Russian LNG while Rosneft would receive the government’s backing 
for a further expansion in the oil sector. The billionaire chief executives 
of all three companies—Aleksei Miller (Gazprom), Gennady Timchenko 
(Novatek) and Igor Sechin (Rosneft)—are long-term associates of Russia’s 
commander in chief, and, given President Putin’s role as distributor of 
patronage, arbiter of opportunities and disputes, and protector of a balance 
in the various groups’ influence, it is no surprise that Novatek, a so-called 
‘independent’ producer, succeeded in sidelining Gazprom in the rush to 
20  Aleksei Grivach, interview by Morena Skalamera, Moscow, Russia, 2 June 2015.
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Asian LNG.21 The rise of Novatek, however, does not suggest that the 
Kremlin ‘set out to create competition’ in gas. It is the result of liberalising 
LNG exports and betting on a very capable company (Novatek) that has 
been attentive to delivering its projects on time and on budget, as well as 
being considered capable enough to take on the challenge of delivering 
Russia’s response to America’s unconventional revolution.22
Russia’s Foray to Asia Picks up Steam
The initial pivot to gas markets in the Asia-Pacific had a rough start, amid 
cooling relations with Japan over the disputed Kuril Islands and Tokyo’s 
endorsement of sanctions against Russia. With South Korea, it was the 
US—not Russia—that was managing to score most market share in the 
country’s burgeoning LNG market. Meanwhile, Russia was edging closer 
to entering into a potentially smothering embrace with China.
In LNG, there is Sakhalin-2, Gazprom’s LNG terminal that, before the 
opening of Yamal LNG, was Russia’s only LNG terminal. Two other 
proposed projects that meant to target Asia, Vladivostok LNG (Gazprom) 
and Sakhalin-1 (Rosneft and Exxon Mobil), have both stalled. As for piped 
exports, we will only see concrete numbers once the Power of Siberia 
is launched. Then, in December 2017, with much fanfare, President 
Putin personally sent off Yamal LNG’s first tanker to China, having been 
able to secure the project’s financing from the French company Total 
(20 per  cent), China’s state-owned energy company China National 
Petroleum Corporation (20 per cent) and Beijing’s state-owned Silk 
Road investment fund (9.9 per cent), a special financial mechanism to 
support China’s ambitious aims with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).23 
China’s state-owned companies, which already retain nearly a third of 
Novatek’s first liquefaction plant, have in 2019 signed agreements to buy 
21  In a recent study, Lamberova and Sonin estimate the relationship between Putin’s inner circle’s 
wealth and the closeness of their relationship to the chief executive, and find that the strength of the 
correlation is enormous in high oil and gas price years. See, N. Lamberova K. and Sonin, ‘Economic 
Transition and the Rise of Alternative Institutions: Political Connections in Putin’s Russia’, Economics 
of Transition 26, no. 4 (2018): 615–48, doi.org/10.1111/ecot.12167.
22  The answer has been developing the Arctic’s resources for exports to Asia.
23  The Silk Road Fund that took a stake in Yamal is a US$40 billion special purpose vehicle to back 
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s BRI—a US$1 trillion plan to build infrastructure across Eurasia.
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a combined 20 per cent stake in Novatek’s new Yamal LNG 2, which will 
produce a projected 19.8 mt of Arctic LNG per year and is expected to 
go online by 2023.
Novatek boasts that further expansion will transform Russia into one of the 
biggest LNG exporters within a decade. The gas producer has aggressive 
plans to command a tenth of the global market by 2030, its CFO Mark 
Gyetvay says, and position Russia as one of the world’s largest exporters 
alongside the US, Qatar and Australia.24 Novatek admits its plans are 
ambitious but insists they are realistic, well-calculated and concrete.
In 2018, according to Russia’s Federal Customs Service, Gazprom’s 
Sakhalin Energy and Novatek’s Yamal LNG revenue spiked by 49.8 per 
cent, reaching US$1.95 billion.25 According to reports, Yamal LNG alone 
contributed a 40 per cent increase in net profits.26 In the first six months 
of its operation, Yamal LNG produced around 2 mmt of LNG.27 Such 
extraordinary spikes in production, rising gas sales and recent acquisitions 
by prominent investors increased Novatek’s net profit nearly six-fold 
between January and June 2019.28
In 2017, at the launch of Yamal LNG, Putin stated ‘the development of 
Arctic reserves is the engine of Russia’s economic development in the 21st 
century’.29 Such words testify the degree of political and financial support 
that the goal of ‘carving out the niche that Russia deserves in this field’ 
enjoys.30 Yamal LNG 1 and 2 aim to help Russia double the country’s 
share of the global LNG market by 2020 from about 4 per cent in 2018 
(in comparison, the US global market share for the same year was higher, 
at about 4.5 per cent, and Australia’s was about six times higher).31
24  ‘Russia Eyes Greater Energy Dominance with Arctic LNG Push’, Moscow Times, 8 April 2019, 
www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/08/russia-eyes-greater-energy-dominance-with-arctic-lng-
push-a65140. 
25  ‘Russia Increased Profits from Oil and LNG Exports’, News, 13 May 2019, news.ru/en/economics/ 
russia-increased-profits-from-oil-and-lng-exports/.
26  Nastassia Astrasheuskaya, ‘Russia’s Novatek to Sell Stake in Arctic Gas Project to Chinese 
Partners’, Financial Times, 25 April 2019.
27  Oksana Kobzeva and Olesya Astakhova, ‘Russia to Boost Presence on Global LNG Market, 
Helped by Lower Costs’, Reuters, 1 June 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-lng/russia-to-boost-
presence-on-global-lng-market-helped-by-lower-costs-idUSKCN1IX4FI. 
28  ‘Profits at Russia’s Novatek Soar on LNG Sale’, Financial Times, 24 July 2019. 
29  ‘Ceremony of First Tanker Loading Under the Yamal LNG Project’, President of Russia, 
8 December 2017, en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/56338.
30  ‘Putin Says Russia to Boost LNG Output for Greater Market Role’, Reuters, 24 April 2019, 
af.reuters.com/article/energyoilnews/idafr4n22004k.
31  International Gas Union, IGU 2018 World LNG Report, 9.
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Both Russia’s and the US’s deliveries are growing fast and present a real 
challenge for Australia in the traditionally attractive Asian LNG markets.32 
By 2019, and in defiance of US-led sanctions, Novatek had already 
successfully attracted other, non-Chinese suitors for its Yamal LNG 2 
plant, such as France’s Total (with a 10 per cent stake) and Japan’s Mitsui 
& Co. and JOGMEC (10 per cent),33 with Saudi Aramco, the kingdom’s 
state oil producer, keen to follow suit. These deep-pocketed investors bring 
Novatek closer to its goal of ramping up Russian LNG production to as 
much as 120 mmt by 2035 and taking market share from Australia and 
the US.34 China’s involvement with Russian LNG extends far beyond the 
role of financier and is linked to the potential of the so-called Northern 
Sea Route (NSR), or, as China sees it, the Polar Silk Road.
China’s Silk Route on Ice
In 2018, China published an Arctic policy paper that explicitly linked 
the NSR to its ambitious BRI strategy, dubbing it the ‘Polar Silk 
Road’—a  useful alternative to the Strait of Malacca—a maritime 
chokepoint whose vulnerability to blockade by the US military has for years 
haunted Chinese leaders.35 For Novatek, the route is attractive because it 
provides much more direct access to the world’s largest LNG consumers 
in Asia. It is these large-volume customers that Russia covets; the Asia-
Pacific region (APR) would receive about 70 per cent of production, with 
shipments planned via the NSR.36 For other shipping companies—most 
32  Asia and Europe are the two distinct LNG-importing regions, and, typically, though not without 
exceptions, robust demand from China, South Korea and Japan have kept the Japan–Korea Marker, 
the Asian benchmark, higher than the European equivalent.
33  ‘Japan Teams Up with Russia in Big Arctic LNG’, Moscow Times, 2 July 2019, www.themoscow 
times.com/2019/07/02/japan-teams-up-with-russia-in-big-arctic-lng-a66248.
34  Kobzeva and Astakhova, ‘Russia to Boost Presence on Global LNG Market’.
35  The State Council, The People’s Republic of China, ‘China’s Arctic Policy’, last modified 
26  January 2018, english.gov.cn/archive/white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 
The paper mainly focuses on climate research and environmental protection, as well as identifying China 
as a ‘near-Arctic state’. The paper is notably silent on China’s interest in accessing the colossal oil and gas 
resources locked under the region’s permafrost.
36  The potential of the Northern Sea Route was brought up in the Kremlin’s 2008 Arctic 
Concept. See, ‘Osnovy gosudarstvennoj politiki Rossijskoi Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 
goda i dal’nejshuiu perspektivu’ [The foundations of the Russian Federation’s policy for the arctic 
zone to 2020 and beyond], Russian Government, 18 September 2008. The same is reiterated in 
‘Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation’, The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian 
Federation, 1 December 2016, www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/official_documents/-/asset_publisher/
CptICkB6BZ29/content/id/2542248.
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notably the China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) but also the 
Danish company Maersk—the route has the potential to cut the costs 
and time between European and Asian markets.
Despite misgivings by some in Moscow that the Chinese BRI already 
encroaches on Russian interests in Central Asia, and that the rhetoric 
of benign environmental protection along the ‘Polar Silk Road’ belies 
an interest in Russia’s vast Arctic hydrocarbon resources, there are big 
advantages for both sides. China has been eager to invest in shipping 
through this route and has set aside money for the development of the 
Arctic. Russia, for all the talk about not selling on the cheap, needs China 
if it wants to tap the Arctic’s full commercial potential and set itself as 
the dominant Arctic shipping state. It is in this context that we should 
interpret Putin’s statement at the 2019 BRI forum in Beijing: ‘Russia 
has emphasized on numerous occasions that PRC [People’s Republic of 
China] President’s Belt and Road initiative rimes with Russia’s idea to 
establish a Greater Eurasian Partnership.’37
For all Russia’s excitement about cutting the journey time between Asia 
and Europe by one to two weeks, the NSR still requires nuclear icebreakers 
to accompany vessels, is more costly than other routes and is only usable 
for six months a year at most. It is well-suited, however, as a  shipping 
route for transporting oil and gas produced in the Arctic, which is where 
Russia’s competitive advantage lies.38 In an attempt to make the route 
commercial, Russia plans to hand control of shipping to Rosatom, the 
state-run nuclear group, to pilot freighters along the route and allow 
year-round navigation.39 Russia hopes that a fleet of nuclear icebreakers 
will encourage investment across the NSR, increase commercial shipping 
through this emerging trade artery, and give more opportunities to Russian 
companies to supply LNG to East Asia (especially to China—already the 
world’s second-largest market), and by doing so it hopes to undercut rivals 
including the US and Australia. In July 2019, Novatek shipped its first 
ever LNG cargo through the NSR and, while traffic is light today, it is 
reasonable to expect that it will grow as the polar ice recedes.
37  ‘Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation’, President of Russia, 26 April 2019, 
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/statements/60378.
38  Richard Milne and Henry Foy, ‘Maersk Launches Container Ship on Arctic Route’, Financial 
Times, 21 August 2018, www.ft.com/content/fb38b6ac-a484-11e8-8ecf-a7ae1beff35b.
39  Natassia Astrasheuskaya, ‘Russia Gives Nuclear Group Control of Arctic Sea Route’, Financial 
Times, 13 December 2018, www.ft.com/content/b5dc9c38-fd56-11e8-aebf-99e208d3e521.
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For China, investing in the ‘Polar Silk Road’ is a golden opportunity 
to potentially gain greater access at favourable prices to Russia’s natural 
resources that would otherwise remain stranded, to secure access to big 
infrastructure contracts that might have gone to Western competitors 
and to provide financing for projects that will benefit Chinese firms. This 
underlines that, for as long as Western sanctions persist, Russia is going 
to need China more than the other way around, and China’s bilateral 
cooperation with Russia—in the Arctic and elsewhere—is seen as part 
of President Xi Jinping’s extensive Belt and Road diplomacy to realise 
China’s broader aspirations in Eurasia.
China–Russia Edging Closer and Closer …
There is substance beyond the pomp of the China–Russia relationship. 
Bilateral trade rose 27.1 per cent in 2018, to a record high of US$107 billion, 
trade increased to US$110 billion in 2019.40 At the same time, the EU’s 
share (of  trade with Russia) fell from 49.6 per cent to 43.8 per cent. 
Europe is still Russia’s biggest trading partner but EU–Russia trade has 
continuously decreased since 2012, dropping by 44 per cent between 
2012 and 2016.41
Beyond (energy) economics, Russia and China increasingly share a view of 
how the world ought to be reordered. They resent America’s ‘hegemony’ 
and share a desire for a more multipolar world order. Putin and Xi also 
have a personal bond forged by their common fear of ‘colour revolutions’ 
(popular uprisings), which they see as having been America’s doing. The fact 
remains, however, that their economic power is impressively dissimilar 
(Russia’s economy is about one-tenth the size of China’s) and while their 
strategic partnership is growing—for instance, in 2019 Russia’s biggest 
military drills since the Cold War included units from China—ultimately, 
the common question of whether a true Sino-Russian strategic alliance 
has materialised is nonsensical. What is clear from years of research into 
the Sino-Russian partnership is that to concentrate persistently on this 
40  ‘Russia’s Trade with China Surges to More than $107 Billion’, RT, 14 January 2019, www.
rt.com/business/448783-russia-china-trade-turnover; ‘Russia–China Bilateral Trade Hit US$110 
Billion in 2019—What Is China Buying?, Russia Briefing, 14 January 2020, www.russia-briefing.
com/news/russia-china-bilateral-trade-hit-us-110-billion-2019-china-buying.html/.
41  From €339 billion in 2012 to €191 billion in 2016. See, ‘Countries and Regions: Russia’, 
European Commission, last modified 20 May 2020, ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-
regions/ countries/russia/.
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question is to do irreparable damage to the nuances of the Sino-Russian 
partnership. In a world of uncertainty, these two powers rely on the depth 
of their relationship, on trust, habits of thought, on the alleged personal 
chemistry between Xi and Putin, and on innovative practices to reshape 
the institutional contexts within which they manage. At the same time, 
their hands are free to adapt to the unpredictability of world politics, make 
adjustments as they go and tackle their still many divergent interests. 
As  seen from Beijing, its objectively much needier neighbour can help 
develop pathways for Sino-centric trade and influence across Eurasia while 
at the same time delegitimising America’s liberal agenda and supporting 
China’s push for a multilateral trading system that better serves its interests.
In energy, big milestones on this journey have been the signing in May 2014 
of a 30-year deal worth US$400 billion to deliver Siberian gas to China 
through the 4,000 km long Power of Siberia, which is set to start pumping 
in December 2019, joining an already-operating oil supply pipeline link. 
In 2015, Chinese oil group Sinopec bought 10 per cent of SIBUR for 
US$1.3 billion, in 2016 Gazprom borrowed €2 billion from the Bank of 
China in its largest ever bilateral loan and in July 2017 an US$11 billion 
financing agreement by China’s Development Bank underlined the extent 
to which the Kremlin had turned its economic focus to China.42
These mega-deals are critical for both sides. In 2016, Russia surpassed 
Saudi Arabia as China’s largest crude supplier and, over the years, has 
strengthened its position.43 The colossal Power of Siberia pipeline, which 
is devoid of in-between transit countries, will arguably service China 
with cheaper and reliable piped gas for decades to come. Crucially, from 
Moscow’s perspective, the benefits of such an expanded Chinese presence 
are not just financial. The burgeoning partnership also sends a message 
to those who thought such mega-deals would be impossible under the 
sanctions regime. China’s tens of billions of dollars worth of cash have 
42  ‘Gazprom Secures €2bn Loan from Bank of China’, Financial Times, 3 March 2016.
43  ‘Russia Leads as Top Crude Supplier to China Overtakes Saudi’, Reuters, 25 June 2019, www.
reuters.com/article/us-china-economy-trade-crude/russia-leads-as-top-crude-supplier-to-china-
overtakes-saudi-idUSKCN1TQ1MS.
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helped offset the effect of ever-tougher rounds of Western sanctions by 
‘insulating’ Russian companies, and have supported Moscow in defying 
the image of an industry that struggles or feels abandoned.44
When asked recently whether Russia was putting too many eggs in the 
Chinese basket, Putin replied: ‘We have sufficient eggs but there are not 
too many baskets to put those eggs in’.45 The Kremlin has been acutely 
aware of the need not to be overly dependent on the Xi–Putin alignment, 
especially in pursuit of Russia’s goals in Asia. Moscow needed to move fast 
to grab larger parts of the Asia-Pacific LNG market. Taken together, the 
Novatek deals are a notable breakthrough in this endeavour.
The Asia‑Pacific ‘Basket’
In the aftermath of the Ukraine crisis, the energy partnership with China 
served to show the world that Moscow always had a plan B. Yet, Moscow’s 
‘China-first’ policy in Asia also had a constraining effect on its engagement 
with other Asian players, especially with countries that have difficult 
relations with Beijing, as is the case with India and Japan.46 This has 
now changed. Increasingly, there is action in addition to diversity talk in 
Russia’s pivot to Asia, thereby somewhat moderating the notion of Russia’s 
difficulty in pursuing a fully independent foreign policy in Asia given its 
near-total reliance on China. In a matter of only a few years, Russia has 
been able to forge deeper military and energy links with countries such as 
India and Japan, both of which are rivals of China. Despite the still deep 
mistrust and the unresolved Kuril Island issue, Moscow has also been able 
to capitalise on stronger energy ties with a key country that is concerned 
about China’s growing regional hegemony—Japan.
44  For instance, on 26 June 2015, the EU foreign ministers decided to extend sanctions against 
Russia until January 2016, following breaches of the Minsk ceasefire plan and a general impasse 
in negotiations on resolving the conflict in eastern Ukraine. See, ‘EU–Russia: Moment of Truth 
Extended by Another 6 Months’, RBTH, 26 June 2015. 
45  Quoted in Lionel Barber and Henry Foy, ‘Vladimir Putin: Liberalism Has “Outlived Its Purpose”’, 
Financial Times, 17 September 2019, www.ft.com/content/2880c762-98c2-11e9-8cfb-30c211dcd229.
46  Bobo Lo, ‘New Order for Old Triangles? The Russia-China-India Matrix’, Russie.Nei.Visions, no. 
100 (April 2017): 18; Shoichi Itoh and Andrew Kuchins, ‘The Energy Factor in Russia’s “Asia Pivot”’, 
in Energy Security in Asia and Eurasia, ed. Mike M. Mochizuki and Deepa M. Ollapally (New York: 
Routledge, 2017), Ch. 7.
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Prior to the launching of Yamal LNG, Japan imported approximately 
10 per cent of LNG from Russia,47 and Moscow was fourth in the list 
of Japan’s LNG suppliers, behind Qatar, Malaysia and Australia.48 Since 
2016, however, the US has jumped into the LNG market in a big way. 
In  2017, US LNG exports quadrupled, with most of the fuel going 
to Asia, as the result of the continuing expansion of US LNG export 
capacity.49 In 2018, American producers shipped around 15 bcm of LNG 
to Japan, China and other Asian countries,50 closing in on Russia’s exports 
of 18.6 bcm to the APR, according to the Russian news agency TASS.51 
The US Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that US LNG 
export capacity will reach 8.9 bcf/d by the end of 2019, making it the 
third largest in the world behind Australia and Qatar.52 This extraordinary 
expansion in the US energy sector upped Russia’s sense of urgency to 
capture a larger market share in Asia.
Despite Gazprom’s early moves with an LNG terminal on the Sakhalin 
island, Gazprom has been slow to secure a stronger position in the 
Asian LNG market due to its longstanding focus on pipeline deliveries 
to Europe.53 Now Novatek—not Gazprom—is eager to take up Russia’s 
‘deserved niche’. Closer cooperation with Japan, the world’s largest LNG 
buyer, is crucial to this goal. Most recently, on the sidelines of the G20 
summit, two Japanese energy companies acquired a 10 per cent share 
47  ‘Japan, Russia Need to Enhance Trust before Gas Pipeline Plans: Minister’, Reuters, 7 August 
2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-russia-gas-idUSKBN1AN0OO.
48  ‘Japan: Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG)’, International Trade Administration, last modified 
13 October 2019, www.trade.gov/knowledge-product/japan-liquefied-natural-gas-lng.
49  ‘US Liquified Natural Gas Exports Quadrupled in 2017’, US Energy Information Administration 
(EIA), 27 March 2018, www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=35512. See also International Gas 
Union, IGU 2018 World LNG Report, 21.
50  According to the EIA, total exports amounted to about 30 bcm, with about 47 per cent being 
delivered to the Asia-Pacific region. See, ‘US Natural Gas Exports and Re-exports by Country’, 
EIA, 31 July 2020, www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_move_expc_s1_a.htm. See also ‘US LNG to Asia in 
Question as Prices Fall, Shipping Costs Rise, Hellenic Shipping News, 29 October 2018, www.hellenic 
shippingnews.com/us-lng-to-asia-in-question-as-prices-fall-shipping-costs-rise/.
51  ‘Russia Increases LNG Exports to Asia-Pacific Countries by 29.2%’, Tass, 2 December 2018, 
tass.ru/ekonomika/5861682.
52  ‘US Liquified Natural Gas Export Capacity to More than Double by the End of 2019, EIA, 
10 December 2018, www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37732.
53  Until recently, the country had just one liquefaction project in operation, the Gazprom-led 
Sakhalin 2 project in its far-east region near Japan, with an annual capacity of about 10 mt.
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in Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2. The deal also stipulates that Novatek will 
supply Japan with around 2 mt of LNG annually—about one-tenth of 
the facility’s capacity.54
Budding relations with Vietnam55 have reinforced a sense of depth to 
Russia’s foray into Asia, while occasional deals with India hold out the 
prospect of a more systematic relationship with Asia as a whole. While 
such relationships are not based solely on energy matters, Russian supplies 
do figure prominently in each. For instance, in October 2016, Indian 
state companies signed energy deals worth billions of dollars with Rosneft 
to buy into the Vankor oilfield, some of Russia’s most promising assets 
in Siberia. In 2017, Rosneft bought a 49 per cent share of India’s Essar 
Oil  Ltd, while in March 2018, Novatek started supplying India with 
Arctic LNG.56
In the case of South Korea, new momentum has been seized following the 
election in 2017 of President Moon Jae. Prior to the power transition in 
Seoul, Russia – South Korea commodity turnover had been US$15 billion,57 
but Moon’s administration wants to double that by 2020.58 However, it 
is the US that has been able to seize a substantial share of South Korea’s 
LNG market, exporting 392.6 bcf between February 2016 and December 
2018, or about 20 per cent of US total LNG exports.59
Yet, unlike the US or Australia, Russia also hopes to reach two of its 
major Asia-Pacific LNG buyers, Japan and South Korea, via pipeline. 
There are two pipeline projects, with both Koreas and Japan, which 
54  ‘Russia Looks for Asia LNG Buyers to Blunt Western Sanctions’ Bite’, Nikkei Asian Review, 
14  July 2019, asia.nikkei.com/Business/Energy/Russia-looks-for-Asia-LNG-buyers-to-blunt-Western-
sanctions-bite2.
55  For instance, in the first seven months of 2017, trade turnover between Vietnam and Russia 
reached nearly US$2 billion, up 27 per cent year-on-year. See, ‘Vietnam, Russia Determined to 
Raise Trade to $10 Bln by 2020’, VietnamNet, 27 October 2017, english.vietnamnet.vn/fms/
business/189085/vietnam--russia-determined-to-raise-trade-to--10-bln-by-2020.html.
56  ‘Russia’s Rosneft Closes Deal to Buy 49 Pct Stake in India’s Essar Oil’, CNBC, 21 August 2017, 
www.cnbc.com/2017/08/21/russian-oil-major-rosneft-seals-biggest-foreign-purchase-ever-in-india-
with-49-percent-stake-in-essar-oil.html.
57  ‘Here Is Why South Korea May Be Turning to Russia’, National Interest, 6 February 2018, 
nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/here-why-south-korea-may-be-turning-russia-24370.
58  Ria Novosti, ‘Yuzhnaya Koreya khochet v 2020 godu uvelichit’ tovarooborot s Rossiyey do $30 
Mlrd’ [South Korea wants to increase trade with Russia to $ 30 billion in 2020], accessed 28 August 
2020, ria.ru/20171130/1509937590.html; Timothy Stanley, ‘The Growing Russia–South Korea 
Partnership’, Diplomat, 24 May 2018.
59  US Department of Energy, Office of Oil and Natural Gas, ‘LNG Monthly’, 2018, www.energy.
gov/sites/prod/files/2019/03/f61/LNG%20Annual%20Report%20-%202018_1.pdf.
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continue to be discussed periodically, but both, for different reasons, 
are unlikely to be built. One is the long-desired Trans-Korean natural 
gas pipeline—a 1,200 km (740 mile) long pipeline to bring Russian gas 
through North Korea to the South’s industrial hubs. Beyond obvious 
political risks, the biggest obstacles are sanctions, which block joint 
ventures with North Korean firms, prohibit financial transactions with 
North Korea, and forbid sales and purchases of commodities. Hence, the 
pipeline’s chances might be reconsidered only if international sanctions 
are lifted.60
The second one is a 1,500 km gas pipeline that is proposed to run 
from Russia’s Sakhalin to the vicinity of Tokyo at an estimated cost of 
US$6 billion. In theory, this pipeline would provide Japan with a source 
of cheap and reliable gas while also lessening the country’s over-reliance 
on LNG. Meanwhile, Russia would further its goal of rebalancing energy 
exports and becoming an influential energy player in Asia. However, in 
the current environment of booming global LNG supplies, Japan might 
simply not need to be tied to Moscow via pipes, as the glut means that 
prices can only fall further. Japan is well aware that restoration of five of 
its nuclear power reactors in 2018, compounded to additional volumes 
of LNG from the US, Australia or, for that matter, Russia, will fuel yet 
more competition.61 
Beyond the geo-economics of the Trans-Korean pipeline, Russia has 
long looked for a way to insert itself into negotiations over Pyongyang’s 
nuclear program, seeking to cultivate ties that date to the Soviet era. Most 
recently, Moscow hoped to use the highly choreographed and largely 
symbolic April 2019 visit of Kim Jong Un to Vladivostok to cast itself as 
a regional powerbroker and geopolitical heavyweight.62 Both China and 
Russia have voiced support for Kim’s gradual approach to disarmament 
and sanctions relief and the Vladivostok summit seemed intended to 
highlight that the Kremlin’s support for a step by step de-escalation 
provides Kim with another tangible partner, beyond Beijing.63 China 
60  Jane Chung, ‘Trans-Korea Gas Pipeline Project Reappears, but Challenges Remain’, Reuters, 
29 June 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-southkorea-gas-russia-expl/trans-korea-gas-
pipeline-project-reappears-but-challenges-remain-idUSKBN1JP0UN.
61  ‘Japan Has Restarted Five Nuclear Power Reactors in 2018’, EIA, 28 November 2018, www.eia.
gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=37633.
62  ‘Kim Kong-un Meets Putin in Russia with US Talks Faltering’, New York Times, 24 April 2019.
63  ‘News conference following Russian-North Korean talks, President of Russia, 25 April 2019, 
en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60370. Both countries, moreover welcome a revival of multilateral 
talks on North Korea, known as the six-party negotiations, which the Trump administration opposes.
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is the North’s biggest business partner by far, accounting for more than 
90 per cent of Pyongyang’s trade according to estimates. Still, in 2018, 
the North imported US$21.6 million worth of mineral fuels and oil from 
Russia, out of US$32.1 million of total fuel imports.64
Game On: The Price Issue
Having only recently ramped up LNG production, the Kremlin is 
perfectly aware that Russia is a long way from fending off established rivals 
in the Asia-Pacific LNG battleground. Be that as it may, in its rapid and 
determined push, the Russian energy sector’s main competitive advantage 
is low production and transportation costs. The gas in the Yamal Peninsula 
is low cost; according to the Moscow-based Skolkovo think tank, average 
production and transportation costs at Yamal LNG for exports to 
Shanghai are seen at just above US$8 per million British thermal units by 
2025. That is roughly the same as the cost for LNG projects in Western 
Australia and less than the approximately US$9 for LNG exports from 
the south-eastern US.65 The same figure for Sakhalin-2, a brownfield, 
stands at below US$4, the lowest among current global projects. Recently, 
Novatek CFO Mark Gyetvay noted that ‘not only does Novatek manage 
in the harsh environment but it sees the Arctic’s location as a competitive 
advantage, because the lower temperatures actually make production costs 
cheaper, given that less energy is needed to chill the gas’.66
That might well be true, but, as the above Skolkovo report notes, the 
harsh geography of Arctic projects inevitably affects transportation and 
construction costs.67 Moreover, as the same report notes, a great part of 
the first Yamal LNG’s profits are reinjected into foreign markets due to 
payments for equipment that Russia imports from South Korea. The lack 
64  Kim Jong Un Woos Vladimir Putin as North Korean Laborers Toil in Russia, Japan Times, 
17 July 2019.
65  Tatiana Mitrova, Alexander Sobko and Zlata Sergeeva, ‘Global LNG Market Transformation: 
To Miss the Windows of Opportunities for Russia’, Energy Centre, Moscow School of Management 
SKOLKOVO, June 2018, 22, energy.skolkovo.ru/downloads/documents/SEneC/News/Russia-on-
global-spg-market-Eng.pdf.
66  He further added that: ‘The cost of producing Yamal gas is only around $0.1 per million British 
thermal units, whereas US producers typically buy their gas on a market such as the Henry Hub, 
where prices are currently about $2.60’. ‘Russia Eyes Greater Energy Dominance with Arctic LNG 
Push’, Moscow Times, 8 April 2019, www.themoscowtimes.com/2019/04/08/russia-eyes-greater-
energy-dominance-with-arctic-lng-push-a65140. 
67  ‘Russia Eyes Greater Energy Dominance with Arctic LNG Push’.
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of homegrown technologies for large-scale liquefaction and transportation 
will continue to erode parts of the profits—and Moscow’s ability to 
compete—unless Russia develops its own LNG technology soon.68
These setbacks notwithstanding, since the US and EU sanctions against 
Russia (implemented after Moscow’s invasion and annexation of Crimea 
in 2014) restricted foreign capital and technology, high-profile partners 
have continued to pour finance into Russia’s energy sector, from China’s 
loans to large equity stakes (such as Indian companies’ 49 per cent in the 
Vankor oilfields) to share purchases (such as Japanese firms’ 10 per cent 
stake in Novatek’s Arctic LNG 2 or French Total’s 10 per cent in both 
Yamal LNG 1 and 2). These are just some examples of the many joint 
venture agreements across Russia’s energy sector since March 2014, which 
have notably also included new-found friendships and energy deals with 
countries in the Middle East. Russia’s go-to partners and financiers for 
major energy projects emphasise that business relationships built over 
decades are not easily curtailed. Five European companies are partnering 
with Gazprom in constructing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline: Germany’s 
Uniper and Wintershall, Engie of France, Anglo-Dutch Shell and 
Austria’s OMV. These five EU energy companies have done business with 
Gazprom for decades and most recently have agreed to finance half of the 
North Stream II €9.5 billion cost.
The companies behind Russia’s Arctic Yamal projects are similarly 
undeterred; abundant gas will be coming to Europe or Asia whatever the 
political impediments thrown up by Brussels or Washington.69 The UK is 
one of the most hawkish towards Moscow, but British energy group BP is 
one of Russia’s biggest foreign investors through its 19.75 per cent stake 
in Rosneft. Bob Dudley, BP’s chief executive, has recently summarised 
this attitude by saying: ‘It is very difficult to remain in business for a long 
time by taking sides … we try to build bridges.’70 The message is simple 
and clear: Russia’s underdeveloped energy fields are too large and lucrative 
to be ignored or to let politics get in the way. Western and Eastern 
companies alike have found ways around the restrictions considering how 
profitable Russia’s unrivalled energy resources still are. Acquisitions and 
international expansion projects have followed.
68  Mitrova, Sobko and Sergeeva, ‘Global LNG Market Transformation’, 23.
69  Natassia Astrasheuskaya, ‘Russia Defies Pipeline Threats over Gas for Europe’, Financial Times, 
18 June 2019, www.ft.com/content/1f6ac3d6-861f-11e9-97ea-05ac2431f453. 
70  Henry Foy, ‘Russian Sanctions: Why “Isolation Is Impossible”’, Financial Times, 12 November 
2018, www.ft.com/content/c51ecf88-e125-11e8-a6e5-792428919cee.
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In light of the above, it is important that scholarship on hydrocarbon 
markets recognises the pervasive influence of creative action by the 
executives who run the world’s energy firms.71 It is no surprise that 
Western sanctions had been largely ineffective in persuading non-US 
companies to stop doing business in Russia. As Rawi Abdelal notes, firms 
have relationships with one another—relationships of great political 
consequence and considerable variability and even as they seek profits, 
uncertainty pervades these firms’ decision-making. In such circumstances, 
their strategies build on their pasts—on business partnerships that have 
lasted for decades—and, by doing so, they actually make and remake 
energy geopolitics. This is evinced by Dudley’s statement that: ‘More and 
more there is a great importance that business plays in bringing the world 
closer. There are a lot of forces trying to push us apart’.72 Occasionally, in 
energy trade and in politics, governmental priorities override the interests 
of firms, but on a day-to-day basis, the commercial logic of firms prevails. 
Meanwhile, all the recent activity of European companies makes it clear 
that even targeted asymmetric sanctions come at a cost to the countries 
imposing them, which is why parts of Europe, for all the anti-Kremlin 
rhetoric, have been reluctant to sever energy trade and investment with 
Russia. That said, future energy sector growth comes at a cost as sanctions 
will curb Russia’s companies’ ability to deploy advanced international 
technologies, and therefore restrain its drive to grow in new Arctic 
locations.73 They might, however, also spur the development of in-house 
technological advances.
Russia’s Interests in Global 
Energy Markets
Since the early 2000s, the Kremlin has talked about the need to diversify 
its energy and economies to the East. While these efforts had been initially 
slow, after 2014 Moscow has made sharp strides in its economic focus 
there. Overall, at home, Moscow’s interests lie in attracting more non-
71  Rawi Abdelal, ‘Firms in Firmament: Hydrocarbons and the Circulation of Power’, in Protean Power: 
Exploring the Uncertain and Unexpected in World Politics, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein and Lucia A. Seybert 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 147–65, doi.org/10.1017/9781108597456.008.
72  Quoted in Foy, ‘Russian Sanctions’.
73  These measures limit Russia’s access to new technology needed to keep its traditional oil and gas 
fields productive. Russia’s energy companies still lag behind the technological might of their Western 
rivals. Many knowledge-sharing agreements and joint ventures terminated by the sanctions. 
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Western investments to the Arctic and in Russia’s Far East, thus helping 
to regenerate the economy of this region. Internationally, however, it aims 
to keep world affairs at a low, not steaming, boil.
In oil, geopolitical turmoil in the Middle East and in other crude-producing 
regions only serves Russia’s economic interests. Of course, geopolitical 
turmoil and the price of oil is closely correlated. Unsurprisingly, Russia 
backs Venezuela’s President Nicolás Maduro; disruptions of crude 
supplies—such as oil from Iran and Venezuela—keep the market tight and 
raise prices, even as the transformative effects of the US’s unconventional 
revolution stabilise the market (crude prices now sit between US$60 
and US$70).74 
In LNG, where the US’s unconventional boom, too, has reshaped markets 
for decades to come, Russia has similar interests. An unsettled US–China 
trade war will alleviate US competition in Asia. The trade spat has already 
given exporters such as Qatar, Australia and Russia an edge in securing 
deals with the world’s second-largest economy even as US companies seek 
to build new export terminals. Bloomberg New Energy Finance estimates 
that Australia, China’s largest LNG supplier, stands to gain most from the 
escalation of US–China trade tensions.75 Any imminent resolution of the 
trade spat would likely see more oil and LNG flow from the US to Asia, 
in turn triggering even more rivalry in the Pacific.
Bloomberg NEF expects that global LNG markets will face about 
16  mmt/y of excess supply in 2019, exerting downward pressure on 
global LNG prices even in Asia, where prices tend to be higher due to 
huge demand and fewer alternative suppliers.76 A BP report concurs, 
noting that global LNG supplies continued their rapid expansion in 
2018, increasing by almost 10 per cent (37 bcm) as a number of new 
liquefaction plants in Australia, the US and Russia either were started or 
74  By broadening supplies, they push oil prices down.
75  China applied a 25 per cent tariff on US goods, including LNG, from 1 June 2019. According 
to Bloomberg NEF, China has already substantially diversified its LNG supply, and Australia’s and 
Malaysia’s LNG share to China totalled 72 per cent in May 2019. Australian LNG comprised 
52 per cent of Chinese imports in May, up from 43 per cent last year. Malaysian LNG is also benefiting 
from the absence of US LNG in China’s supply mix, rising to 20 per cent in May from an average 




76  Maggie Kuang, ‘Global LNG: The Big Swing’, Bloomberg, spotlight.bloomberg.com/story/
global-lng-the-big-swing. 
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ramped up.77 Japan remains the world’s largest LNG importer, but it is 
China, India and other emerging Asian markets that will see their share 
of trade increase substantially, reaching 45 per cent of trade volumes by 
2023—more than double the share of 2013.78
As the US and other global LNG exporters rewrite the world’s markets 
for natural gas, Russia has an interest in closer cooperation with Japan, 
China and South Korea, the world’s fastest-absorbing LNG buyers. It also 
quietly welcomes an escalating US–China trade war.
Russia as Australia’s LNG Export 
Competitor
According to BP’s 2019 annual report, for all of 2018 LNG imports 
from Australia were king in Japan, China and South Korea, the three core 
Asian markets in which Russia aims to secure a stronger grip.79 But Asian 
demand is expected to slow down, a development further intensified 
by Japan’s relaunch of four nuclear facilities and new LNG ‘optionality’ 
(from Russian LNG, among others). Conversely, Australia is traditionally 
a high-cost location.
The prospect of the further rapid increases of low-cost LNG in Russia 
means that the country represents an increasingly serious competitor in 
what, for now, is Australia’s stronghold.80 In the medium term, booming 
global LNG production will create a glut both in Europe and Asia.81 
In  the long run, however, the APR is poised to become the catalyst of 
77  BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 6, www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/business-sites/en/
global/corporate/pdfs/energy-economics/statistical-review/bp-stats-review-2019-full-report.pdf.
78  ‘Gas 2018: Analysis and Forecasts to 2023’, IEA, www.iea.org/gas2018/.
79  BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 39.
80  Beyond Russia, the Asia-Pacific battleground is expected to be flooded by plentiful supplies from 
the US (expected to double export capacity to more than 40 mmt in 2019), Malaysia, Indonesia and 
Qatar, among others.
81  Anna Shiryaevskaya, ‘LNG Ships Are Turning Away from Europe’s Gloomy Gas Market’, 
Bloomberg, 5 July 2019, www.bloombergquint.com/business/lng-vessels-turn-away-from-europe-s-
gloomy-natural-gas-market; Sabina Zawadzki, ‘European Gas Prices Exceed Asian Spot LNG, Shuts 
Arbitrage’, Reuters, 15 July 2019, www.reuters.com/article/us-global-lng-europe/european-gas-prices-
exceed-asian-spot-lng-shuts-arbitrage-idUSKCN1UA1L6.
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global LNG growth. Currently, the region accounts for approximately 
three-quarters of global LNG trade,82 with that amount projected to 
increase to as much as 86 per cent in the next decade.83
The way Australia positions itself to preserve market share will determine 
its status in the region over the next decade. The Financial Times has 
recently reported that, in addition to overseas competition, chaotic 
policymaking is threatening to cut short Australia’s tenure as the world’s 
biggest exporter of LNG. Australia now faces intense competition from 
the likes of the US and Russia—producers that prioritise stable energy 
policies and clarity over the outlook for costs. Meanwhile, apparent lack 
of policy coordination and bickering at federal and state levels has become 
a risk for Australian LNG producers and has already delayed investment 
decisions in Canberra. Such hurdles are especially difficult when one 
has to compete with countries such as Russia, where handpicked mega-
projects in the energy industry, once declared geopolitically critical, 
become patriotic national undertakings.
Homegrown Arctic LNG is an absolute priority of the Putin administration. 
This is somewhat reminiscent of the zeal with which Soviet mega-projects 
were implemented; there was scope for disagreement on how the economy 
should be organised until a decision had been reached, at which point the 
decision had to be implemented in a strictly disciplined manner at all 
affected levels of society. In Russia, rigid hierarchical subordination still 
dictates the execution of the most ambitious, costly and geopolitically 
critical energy projects—such as the two Yamal LNG plants. While 
deliberating on important issues such as a coherent national emissions 
policy and the need to balance between LNG exports and energy security 
at home, Canberra should do so with the awareness that some of its 
overseas competitors have a clear, top-down notion of what energy market 
competition means.
Already the world’s top exporter of pipeline gas and second-biggest 
shipper of crude oil, Moscow’s push to be a major LNG exporter is real. 
In the APR, however, Russia will not be able to replicate the unusually 
strong hold it enjoys over European gas markets or make use of heavy-
handed pipeline politics essential to the Kremlin’s claim of greatness. This 
82  ‘Perspectives on the Development of the LNG Market Hubs in the Asia-Pacific Region’, EIA, 
2 March 2017, www.eia.gov/analysis/studies/lng/asia/.
83  ‘Asia to Dominate Long-term LNG Demand Growth’, BloombergNEF, 12 September 2018, 
about.bnef.com/blog/asia-dominate-long-term-lng-demand-growth/.
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has to do with the inherent characteristics of LNG transportation and 
trade along with well-established competition. In Asia, Russian LNG will 
be purely business; traded like Russian oil and very much deprived of its 
strategic foreign policy status.
That said, the many investment partners that Russia has been able to 
secure in its post-Ukraine phase have succeeded in lessening the country’s 
dependence on Western financing, blunting the concerted efforts by 
the US to economically isolate Russia. Stakes, joint ventures, foreign 
direct investment and other types of corporate agreements with energy 
firms from Europe, Japan, India and the Middle East have supported 
Russia’s foray to Asia and, to some extent, belie the narrative of a Russian 
Pivot to Asia that stops at China.
New competition by Russia will shape the Asia-Pacific market and may be 
a hindrance to Australia’s business. However, on the question of whether 
Australia will be able to maintain its crown as the world’s largest LNG 
exporter, Russia is not likely to be a singularly determinative factor.
This text is taken from Russian Energy Strategy in the Asia-Pacific: 
Implications for Australia, edited by Elizabeth Buchanan, published 2021 
by ANU Press, The Australian National University, Canberra, Australia.
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